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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The names of all parties to the proceedings in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah~Central Division are set forth in the caption of this brief. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES ETC. 
Statutes 
The statutes determinative of this matter and of central importance to this 
Certification are U.C.A. §31A-22-302(1)(a), U.C.A. §31A-22-303(1)(a)(v) and U.C.A. 
§31A-22-304(1)(a)(b) and (2). 
U.C.A. §31A-22-302{l)(a) provides: 
( 1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased 
to satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirements of §41-12A-301 
shall include: 
(a) Motor vehicle liability coverage under 
§3 lA-22-303 and §3 lA-22-304. 
U.C.A. §31A-22-303(1)(a)(v) provides: 
(l)(a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21, 
Insurance Contracts in General, and Chapter 22, Part 2, Liability Insurance in 
General, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31 (A)-22- · 
302(1)(a) shall: 
(v) cover damages or injury resulting from a covered driver of a 
motor vehicle who is stricken by an unforeseeable paralysis, seizure, or 
other unconscious condition and who is not reasonably aware that paralysis, 
iv 
seizure, or other unconscious condition is about to occur to the extent that a 
person of ordinary prudence would not attempt to continue driving. 
(b) The driver's liability under Subsection (l)(a)(v) is limited to the Gil 
msurance coverage. 
U.C.A. §31A-22-304(1) (a)(b) and (2) provides: 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit the 
insurer's liability under that coverage below the following: 
(l)(a) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death of one 
person, arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident; 
(b) subject to the limit for one person in Subsection (l)(a), in the amount 
of $65,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death of two or more persons 
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident; 
(2) $80,000 in any one accident whether arising from bodily injury to or the 
death of others, or from destruction of, or damage to, the property of others. 
Rules 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 41. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,2 
V 
STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS CERTIFIED 
The Honorable Judge Jill Parrish of the United States Federal District Court for 
the District of Utah-Central Division ("district court") pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure (U.R.A.P.) certified the following questions: 
1. Does Utah Code Ann.§31(A)-22-303(1)(a)(v) impose liability on an 
insured driver or damages to third parties resulting from the driver's unforeseeable loss of 
consciousness while driving, thereby abrogating the common law principle that liability 
for personal injury may not be imposed absent fault or negligence? 
2. If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, is the driver's liability limited 
to the limits of the applicable insurance policy or the applicable minimum statutory limit? 
~ (Certifying Questions: R. 211) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On October 29, 2014, Appellant ("Lancer") filed a Complaint for Declaratory 
Relief ("CDR") asking the district court to interpret two statutes: U.C.A.§3 lA-22-
303(1 )(a)(v) and U.C.A § 31A-22-304(1)(a)(b) and (2). (These statutes are quoted above, 
pages iv and v). The Amended, Second Amended and Third Amended Complaints for 
Declaratory Relief ("CDRs") were filed on 2/4/2013, 1/19/2016 and 1/20/2016, 
respectively to correct jurisdictional defects. 
After the answers were filed, on August 28, 2015, Lancer moved for summary 
judgment. On October 30, 2015, the Appellees ("Injured Parties") filed an opposition to 
that summary judgment and a cross-motion for summary judgment. On December 5, 
2015, Lancer filed its opposition to the cross-motion and a reply to the Injured Parties' 
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opposition to its motion for summary judgment. The Injured Parties filed their reply to 
Lancer's opposition to their cross-motion on January 8, 2016. 
In response to the parties' motions, on January 14, 2016, the district court entered 
an Order Regarding Possible Certification. Lancer and the Injured Parties' responded to 
the Court's order by providing U.R.A.P Rule 4i briefs on January 20, 2016 and January 
25, 2016, respectively. On March 28, 2016, the district court signed an order certifying 
the questions outlined on page 1 to this brief. On May 26, 2016, the Utah Supreme Court 
granted Certification. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
STIPULATED UNDISPUTED FACTS1 
1. Lancer insured Defendants Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. ("Lake 
Shore") (no longer in existence) and Debra Kay Jarvis ("Jarvis"), an employee of Lake 
Shore and the driver of the bus at the time of the October 10, 2009 accident.2 (Exhibit 2: 
Lancer Policy) (R. 46, ,Il) 
2. The passengers in the bus at the time of the accident and who are claiming 
injury include Defendants Janna Crane ("Crane"); Elizabeth Hutchison ("Hutchison"); 
Mette Seppi ("Seppi"); and Tiffany Thayne ("Thayne") ("Injured Parties"). (R. 46, ,I2) 
3. On October 10, 2009, Jarvis was employed as a bus driver with Lake Shore. 
Lake Shore was hired to provide transportation for the American Fork High School Band 
1 The facts stated herein are stipulated to as undisputed and material for purposes of the 
summary judgment motions filed in the trial court and for this appeal. The parties reserve 
the right to dispute these facts as appropriate in the underlying state lawsuits. 
2 Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines and Debra Kay have not entered appearances. 
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to attend a band competition in Pocatello, Idaho. Lake Shore agreed to provide 
transportation for the band to and from Idaho. (R. 46, ,r3) 
4. The accident at issue occurred on October 10, 2009 at 7: 17 p.m., when 
Jarvis suffered a sudden and unforeseeable loss of consciousness while driving, causing 
the bus to leave the roadway, hit a ravine and roll on its side. (R. 46, ,r4) 
5. When Jarvis left Pocatello, she did not feel ill and had no reason to believe 
she had a medical condition that could cause incapacitation or loss of consciousness. (R. 
46, ,I5) 
6. Prior to the accident Jarvis never lost consciousness or suffered from a 
similar event. Jarvis had not been ill, and had no knowledge that this could occur, and 
that it occurred suddenly and without warning, rendering her unconscious and 
incapacitated causing the bus to veer off the roadway. (R. 46, ,r6) 
7. Jarvis' loss of consciousness was a result of an "independent, intervening, 
\¢} unforeseeable medical condition". (R. 46, ,I7) 
8. Following the October 10, 2009 accident the Injured Parties filed lawsuits 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court: 
a. Janna Crane filed a Complaint (March 21, 2013) captioned Janna 
Crane v. Depra Kay Jarvis, an individual, and Lake Shore Motor Coach 
Lines, a corporation, Civil No. 130400418, pending before the 
Honorable Christine Johnson alleging personal injury as a result of this 
accident. Subsequently, the Complaint was amended (August 27, 2014) 
to include a cause of action based on U.C.A. §31A-22-303(l)(a)(v). A 
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Second Amended Complaint (January 8, 2015) was filed adding Lancer 
as a party. ~ 
b. Elizabeth Hutchison filed a Complaint (March 22, 2013) captioned 
Elizabeth Hutchison v. Debra Kay Jarvis, an individual, and Lake Shore 
~ 
Motor Coach Lines, Inc., Civil No.130400423, pending before the 
Honorable Christine Johnson, alleging personal injury. The Complaint 
was amended on (August 27, 2014, and January 8, 2015), to add a Sixth ~ 
Cause of Action based on U.C.A. §31A-22-303(1)(a)(v) and adding 
Lancer as a party. ~ 
C. Mette Seppi filed a Complaint (January 17, 2014) captioned Mette 
Seppi v. Debra Kay Jarvis, an individual, and Lake Shore Motor Coach 
G.i 
Lines, Inc., Civil No. 140400088, pending before the Honorable Lynn 
W. Davis, alleging personal injury as a result of the accident. The 
Complaint was amended (January 28, 2015), adding a Sixth Cause of ~ 
Action based on U. C. A.§31A-22-303(1)(a)(v) and adding Lancer as a 
party. 
~ 
d. Tiffany Thayne filed a complaint (December 12, 2014) captioned 
Tiffany Thayne v. Debra Kay Jarvis, an individual; Lake Shore Motor 
Coach Lines, Inc., a corporation; and Lancer Insurance Company, an (;,, 
Illinois Corporation, in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for 
Utah County, State of Utah, Civil No. 140401741, pending before the 
"" Honorable Darold McDade, adding a Sixth Cause of Action based on 
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~ 
9. 
U.C.A. §31A-22-303(1)(a)(v) and adding Lancer as a party. (R. 47 & 
48, 18) 
On March 12, 2014, Crane and Hutchison filed motions for partial 
summary judgment [sic summary judgment] based on liability citing to U.C.A. §31A-22-
303(l)(a)(v), Motor Vehicle Liability Coverage. Both matters were heard by the 
Honorable Judge Christine Johnson. That section states that an automobile policy shall 
provide: 
(a) Utah Code Annotated §31A-22-303(l)(a)(v) provides: 
(1) (a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 
21, Insurance Contracts in General, and Chapter 22, Part 2, Liability 
Insurance in General, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage 
under Subsection 31A-22-302O)(a) shall: 
( v) cover damages or injury resulting from a covered driver of a 
motor vehicle who is stricken by an unforeseeable paralysis, seizure, 
or other unconscious condition and who is not reasonably aware that 
paralysis, seizure, or other unconscious condition is about to occur to 
the extent that a person of ordinary prudence would not attempt to 
continue driving. 
(b) The driver's liability under Subsection (l)(a)(v) is limited to 
the insurance coverage. 
~ (R. 48, 19) 
10. Citing to the above statutory language, Crane and Hutchinson argued (in 
the underlying lawsuits) in their partial summary judgment motion [sic summary 
judgment] that "a sudden medical emergency ... does not establish a defense in Utah." 
"To the contrary, a sudden onset of a medical emergency establishes a duty on the part of 
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[Lake Shore and Jarvis] to pay [Crane's and Hutchinson's] damages as established at trial 
up to the policy limits of [Lake Shore's and Jarvis'] auto insurance policy." (R. 49, ,rIO) ~ 
11. In opposition to Crane and Hutchison's partial summary judgments [sic 
summary judgment], Lake Shore and Jarvis, in the underlying lawsuit, took the following 
position(s): (1) U.C.A. §31A-22-303(l)(a)(v) only describes the type of vehicle coverage 
a policy must have; (2) the emergency medical statute is not ambiguous; (3) the "sudden 
emergency" defense is good law and applies to bar coverage [sic liability]; (4) the statute 
is not ambiguous and does not create a strict liability cause of action; ( 5) Crane and 
Hutchison are only entitled to a judgement against Lake Shore and Jarvis based on a 
showing of negligence; and (R. 49, ,r1 I) 
12. On June 6, 2014 the court ruled on Crane's and Hutchison's motions for 
partial summary judgement [sic summary judgment] in the underlying lawsuits, finding 
that: 
(a) The language of the statute at issue is not ambiguous. "It simply 
directs that insurance policies for motor vehicles must include coverage for 
damages resulting from drivers who suffer from an unforeseeable 
unconscious condition. Nowhere does it state that a new form of strict 
liability has been created. Nowhere does it state that any principles of tort 
law have been abrogated or supplanted. To adopt Crane's position is to 
impose a marked change in tort law absent any legislative direction. This 
the court is unwilling to do". 
(Exhibit 2: Court's Memorandum Decision) (R. 49, ,r12) 
13. The Court also concluded that: "Subsection (v) does not apply to a 
claim of negligence. Rather, by its own terms it applies to the obligations of an 
insurer to provide coverage. Therefore, it cannot serve as the basis for a finding of 
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liability and depends upon facts and legal theories not touched upon in (Crane's 
and Hutchison's) Complaints. Accordingly, that theory is not properly before the 
Court in this summary judgment motion. Summary judgment is properly denied. 
(Exhibit 2: Court's Memorandum Decision Pg. 10) (R. 49, ifl3) 
14. Lancer filed its CDR on October 29, 2014, and an Amended CDR on 
February 4, 2015, alleging that the Injured Parties' claims are barred by the 
"Sudden Incapacity" defense. (R. 50, ifl4) 
15. Lancer also alleges that Utah Code Annotated §3 lA-22-303(1 )(a)(v) 
is not ambiguous and simply directs insurers that policies for motor vehicle 
insurance must include coverage for damages resulting from drivers who suffer 
from an unforeseeable medical condition; that the statute does not state that a new 
form of risk has been created, nor does it state that any principles of tort law have 
been abrogated; that, in fact, to hold otherwise would impose a significant change 
in tort law, without any legislative direction; that the statute does not create a strict 
liability cause of action; and finally, if at all, the recovery is limited to the 
statutory minimums. (R. 50, ,115; R.71, page 7) 
16. Following the Court's order, the Injured Parties stayed all 
underlying complaints and amended complaints on the following dates: Crane 
(2/24/25), Hutchison (2/24/15), Seppi (2/24/15) and Thayne (3/27/15), pending 
resolution of the Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief. (R. 50, if 16) 
17. In their response to the Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Crane, 
Hutchison, Thayne and Seppi allege that Utah Code Annotated §31A-22-303(l)(a)(v) 
-7-
creates strict liability for insured drivers who become suddenly and unforeseeably 
medically incapacitated while driving a motor vehicle, resulting in injury. (R. 50, 51, ,Il 7) 
18. Other statutory provisions at issue include Utah Code Annotated §31 A-22-
302( 1 )(a), and §3 lA-22-304(1 )(a)(b) and (2). 
(A) Utah Code Annotated §JlA-22-302(1) (a) provides: 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased 
to satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 
41-12a-301 shall include: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 3 IA-22-
303 and 3 IA-22-304; 
(B) Utah Code Annotated §31A-22-304(l)(a)(b) and (2) provides: 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit 
the insurer's liability under that coverage below the following: 
(l)(a) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or 
death of one person, arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any 
one accident; 
(b) subject to the limit for one person in Subsection (l)(a), 
in the amount of $65,000 because of liability for bodily injury 
to or death of two or more persons arising out of the use of a 
motor vehicle in any one accident; or 
(2) $80,000 in any one accident whether arising from bodily 
injury to or the death of others, or from destruction of, or damage to, 
the property of others. 
(R. 51, ,II 8) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On October 10, 2009, Debra Jarvis ("Jarvis") was employed as a bus driver with 
Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. ("Lake Shore"). Ms. Jarvis was driving a Lake 
Shore bus to a high school band event when she suddenly and unexpectedly lost 
consciousness and drove off the road. As a result of which four ( 4) passengers in the bus 
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at the time, Janna Crane, Elizabeth Hutchison, Mette Seppi and Tiffany Thayne, alleged 
personal injury collectively ("Injured Parties"). All four individuals filed suit claiming 
various forms of negligence on the part of Jarvis and Lake Shore ("underlying 
lawsuits"). 3 
Two of the Injured Parties, Crane and Hutchison, filed for summary judgment 
alleging that Jarvis' sudden loss of consciousness caused the accident, giving rise to a 
statutory obligation to pay damages up to the policy limits. In support of this, they cite to 
U.C.A. §31A-22-303(l){a)(v) (the "Medical Emergency" statute), claiming that this 
statute applies and creates a strict liability cause of action. Lancer maintains, however, 
that this statute only outlines the mandatory requirements for motor vehicle liability 
coverage. Among those requirements in Subsection (v) is that motor vehicle liability 
coverage must include a provision that covers damages resulting from an unforeseen 
medical condition rendering the driver incapacitated. Specifically, that insurance policies 
must cover: 
"damages or injury resulting from a covered driver of a motor vehicle who 
is stricken by an unforeseeable paralysis, seizure, or other unconscious 
condition and who is not reasonably aware that paralysis, seizure, or other 
unconscious condition is about to occur to the extent that a person of 
ordinary prudence would not attempt to continue driving". 
The position taken by the Injured Parties is that this statute creates a strict liability 
cause of action, and they are entitled to damages up to the policy limits without having to 
show fault. 
3 The underlying lawsuits allege negligence, breach of duty to passenger, negligence per 
se, and res ipsa loquitur. 
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Lancer's position is that: ( 1) the Sudden Incapacity defense, that tort law does not 
impose liability absent fault, is still good law; (2) the Medical Emergency statute only 
describes the requirements for motor vehicle liability insurance, among those is that there 
must be coverage for an unforeseeable act rendering a driver incapacitated; (3) this 
statute is not ambiguous; (4) there can be no liability absent fault, and in circumstances of 
an unforeseen medical emergency rendering the driver incapacitated, the driver cannot be 
liable for the injuries caused; ( 5) under the Medical Emergency statute the Injured Parties 
are only entitled to judgment against Lake Shore and Jarvis based on a showing of 
negligence, it does not create a cause of action for strict liability; and ( 6) if the Injured 
Parties are entitled to any recovery, it is limited to the statutory minimums (See 
U.C.A§31A-22-304). 
Lancer's position is supported by the Hon. Christine Johnson's June 6, 2014 ruling 
denying these motions for summary judgment, finding that: 
In the present case, the plain language of Subsection ( v) is not ambiguous. 
It simply directs that insurance policies for motor vehicles must include 
coverage for damages resulting from drivers who suffer from an 
unforeseeable unconscious condition. Nowhere does it state that a new 
form of strict liability has been created. Nowhere does it state that any 
principles of tort law have been abrogated or supplanted. To adopt Crane's 
position is to impose a marked change in tort law absent any legislative 
direction. This the court is unwilling to do. 
(Exhibit 1: Ruling and Order on Plaintiffs MSJ: pg.7) (R. 71, page 7). 
After the court's ruling, the Injured Parties filed amended complaints in the 
underlying lawsuit, addressing the inteipretation of the Medical Emergency statute at 
issue. Lancer then filed its CDR (R. 10-18) and Amended Complaints for Declaratory 
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Relief ("CDRs") (R. 19-39)4 in the district court reaffirming Lancer's above positions. 
Because of the CDR, the parties in the underlying lawsuits stipulated to a stay pending 
resolution of the CDR by the district court. 
Lancer filed for Summary Judgment on its CDR requesting the Court find as a 
matter of law that the statutory language of the Emergency Medical statute is not 
ambiguous, requiring only that a Motor Vehicle policy provide coverage for a driver 
who is suddenly stricken by an unforeseeable medical condition resulting in injury to a 
third party. The Injured Parties filed a cross-motion for summary judgment also taking 
\J the position that the statute is not ambiguous and requires that in all circumstances where 
there is an unforeseen medical condition resulting in injury that the Court find that the 
victim must be compensated up to the policy limits. In essence, asking the Court to find 
that the Emergency Medical statute establishes strict liability and that a finding of fault is 
not necessary. 
Lancer is requesting the Court find that the Injured Parties' interpretation of this 
statute is not valid, and that Lancer's position is well taken, that is, that this particular 
statutory section only requires that coverage for unforeseen medical conditions be 
included in motor vehicle liability policies. The statute does not alter tort law, nor does it 
establish a cause of action in strict liability. Lancer also requests that this Court find if 
the Injured Parties are entitled to damages then their damages are subject to the statutory 
minimums. 
4 Lancer subsequently filed Second and Third Amended Complaints to correct 
jurisdictional defects (R. 168-170 and R. 179-187, respectively). 
-11 -
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
THE UNFORESEEN LOSS OF CONSCIOUNESS IS A 
COMPLETE DEFENSE TO A NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
Since 1960, under Utah case law, a driver who is rendered unconscious or 
incapacitated due to an unforeseen medical emergency is not liable for negligence (the 
"Sudden Incapacity" defense). Porter v. Price, 355 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Utah 1960), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Utah 1993). 
In Porter, the defendant, a 17-year-old diabetic, was driving his car when he 
suffered a severe insulin reaction, causing him to lose control of his vehicle impacting 
plaintifrs parked vehicle. At the time of the accident his diabetes was well-regulated; 
there was no change in his routine; his prior insulin reactions were mild, had never 
incapacitated him, and were always preceded by a warning. He had never had a severe 
reaction like the one on the day of the accident, which occurred without warning.· It was 
a rare occurrence and "its likelihood of happening to him was therefore not great enough 
to cause a reasonable man to act any differently than he acted." Id. 67. The jury found 
that he was not negligent. 
On appeal, Plaintiff challenged jury instructions #9 and # 10 addressing the Sudden 
Incapacity defense. 
Instruction No. 9 provided: 
"A driver of an automobile who is stricken by paralysis, seized by a fit or 
otherwise rendered unconscious and who still continues to drive while 
unconscious and causes damages or injury to another cannot be held responsible 
therefor unless he was reasonably aware that he was about to lose consciousness to 
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the extent that a person of ordinary prudence would not attempt to continue 
driving." Id. 68. 
Instruction No. 10 provides: 
"You are instructed that fainting or loss of consciousness while driving is a 
complete defense to an action based on negligence if such loss of consciousness 
was not foreseeable. If you find that defendant. .. was suffering from an 
unforeseen insulin reaction, resulting in a fainting spell or loss of consciousness at 
the time of this accident, then you must return a verdict in favor of the defendant 
and against plaintiffs. '' 
Id. 68. 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the use of these jury instructions and affirmed the jury's 
i.;J finding in favor of the driver. 
In April 1993, the Utah Supreme Court in Hansen v. Heath, 852 P .2d 977 (Utah 
1993) reaffirmed the Sudden Incapacity defense. In Hansen, defendant blacked out while 
driving and plead as an affirmative defense ''that he had suddenly and without prior 
warning lost consciousness at the time of the accident and was therefore, not liable for 
[plaintiffs] injuries". Id. 978. The jury found no negligence on the defendant. The 
Supreme Court affinned the jury's verdict holding that: "if a person driving an 
automobile is suddenly stricken by an illness that he or she has no reason to anticipate 
and the illness makes it impossible for him or her to control the car, that person is not 
liable for negligence associated with the accident". Id. 978, fn.2 ( citing to Porter, Id. 68). 
In October 1993 the Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue again in Randle, 
which reaffirmed Porter finding that there is no tort liability for personal injury "absent 
fault or negligence on the part of the defendant." Jd.1335. Porter was overruled to the 
extent it permitted the use of a separate jury instruction on unavoidable accident. The 
- 13 -
court eliminated this instruction finding it confusing and unnecessary in light of "the 
traditional negligence framework for determining liability". Id 1336. (See also Green v. 
Lowder, 29 P.3d 638, 644 ,I16, 17 &18 (2001)). 
The Sudden Incapacity defense was last addressed in Utah by the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Utah in Solorio v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (D. Utah 
2002) (Solorio I), ajf'd, 85 Fed. Appx. 705 (10th Cir. 2004) (Solorio II) (an unpublished 
opinion)5. The district court, in Solorio I, determined that: "in Utah, a sudden and 
unforeseeable loss of consciousness that incapacitates a driver does not constitute 
negligence because the circumstances are beyond the control of the driver". Id. 1283. 
Solorio I is significant because it was decided after the enactment of the Medical 
Emergency statute in 1998. Yet, in spite of the statute both the district court and the 10th 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Sudden Incapacity defense on summary judgment, 
lending further credence to Lancer's position that this statute did nothing more than 
require policies to have "medical emergency" coverage. It does not mention, nor does it 
create, a cause of action for strict liability. 6 
The cases Lancer relies on were decided prior to the enactment of the Medical 
Emergency statute at issue, but these cases are still good law given that the statute at 
5 Solorio II ''while it lacks precedential value, it may be cited for its persuasive value". 
(See DuCiv R7-2(a)). 
6 Solorio /raised the statute, but mislabeled it "§31A-22-303(l)(a)(iv)" instead of 
subsection (v). The defendant in that case, whose driver lost consciousness as a result of 
a seizure-like event, argued in his reply that the statute merely addresses insurance policy 
coverage, and does not apply to the case. (See Exhibit 1: reply memo supporting 
defendant's motion for S.J. at 8, ECF No. 37). The Utah district court found that rule 
announced in Porter remains good law, and entitled the defendant to summary judgment. 
(Solorio I, Id. ,I1283) 
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issue only mandates what coverages are necessary for motor vehicle insurance policies. 
The Medical Emergency statute "is directed to insurance companies" and "simply 
specifies what coverage a vehicle insurance policy must include in order to satisfy the 
;iJ Motor Vehicle Insurance Code requirements". State v. Biggs, 167 P.3d 544 (Utah App. 
2007), Id.115. The statute unambiguously provides for the type of policy for emergency 
medical coverage, it does not create a new duty outside of existing tort law allowing strict 
liability against Defendants Jarvis and/or Lake Shore (in the underlying action), but 
requires a showing of negligence or proof of fault. 
The case law relied on by Lancer, which includes Porter, Randle, Hansen, Green 
and Solorio I and II, supports its position that there can be no liability absent fault, and is 
still good law. As such, the Sudden Incapacity defense bars coverage for the Injured 
Parties in· this case. 
POINT II 
U.C.A. §31A-22-303(l)(a)(v) SPECIFIES THE COVERAGES A VEIDCLE 
INSURANCE POLICY MUST HA VE 
The Medical Emergency statute unambiguously provides only for the types of 
coverage insurance policies must have to comply with the statute, which identifies the 
required components of motor vehicle insurance policies. 
U.C.A. §31A-22-303 provides that: 
In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21, 
Insurance Contracts in General, and Chapter 22, Part 2, Liability Insurance 
in General, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 
§ 31A-22-302(l)(a) shall: 
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( v) ~ damages or injury resulting from a covered driver of a 
motor vehicle who is stricken by an unforeseeable paralysis, seizure, or 
other unconscious condition and who is not reasonably aware that 
paralysis, seizure, or other unconscious condition is about to occur to the 
extent that a person of ordinary prudence would not attempt to continue 
driving.(Emphasis added). 
U.C.A. §31A-22-302(l)(a), Required components of motor vehicle insurance 
policies-Exceptions, states: 
( 1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased 
to satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirements of Section 41-
12a-3017 shall include: 
. (a) motor vehicle liability coverage under §§3 IA-22-
303 and 31A-22-304 ... 8 
The statute's plain language is "the best evidence of legislative intent". (Anderson 
v. Bell, 234 P.3d 1147, ,I9 (Utah 2010). There is nothing in the statutory language of 
either statute that addresses damages or directs the entry of personal liability judgments 
against innocent drivers who suffer from medical incapacitation. Both of these statutes 
unambiguously address the types of coverages insurance policies must provide. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Biggs, 167 P.3d 544 (Utah App. 2007), 
discussed the Medical Emergency statute and confirmed that: "[t]his section, however, 
simply specifies what coverage a vehicle insurance policy must include in order to satisfy 
the Motor Vehicle Insurance Code requirements ... .It is therefore directed to insurance 
7 U.C.A. §41-12a-301(2)(a) provides that: "every resident owner of a motor vehicle shall 
maintain owner's or operator's security in effect at any time that the motor vehicle is 
operated on a highway or on a quasi-public road or parking area within the state; .... " 
8 3 lA-22-304 provides the minimum limits a motor vehicle liability policy must have. 
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companies, not vehicle owners, and in no way relieves Defendant of any other statutory 
obligation she has to insure her car". Id.,II5. (Emphasis added). 
The Medical Emergency statute does not create a new duty outside existing tort or 
~ insurance law allowing strict liability against the drivers who experience medical 
emergencies. There must still be a showing of fault. Lancer's position that this is a 
coverage, and not a liability statute, was confirmed by Judge Johnson's memorandum 
decision denying the Injured Parties' motion for summary judgment in the underlying 
action. In this regard, Judge Johnson stated that: 
In the present case, the plain language of subsection ( v) is not ambiguous, it 
simply directs that insurance policies for motor vehicles must include 
coverages for damages resulting from drivers who suffer from an 
unforeseeable unconscious condition. Nowhere does it state that a new 
form of strict liability has been created. Nowhere does it state that any 
principles of tort law have been abrogated or supplanted. To adopt [ the 
Injured Parties'] position is to impose a marked change in tort law absent 
any legislative direction. This court is unwilling to do this." 
(Exhibit 1: Ruling and Order on Plaintifrs MSJ: pg 7) (R. 71) 
The two statutes cited above, in conjunction with Judge Johnson's opinion, 
support Lancer's position that the Medical Emergency statute at issue merely describes 
the type of coverage that insurance policies must provide, and does not discuss nor 
address liability of any kind. 
POINT III 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-303(l)(a)(v) DOES NOT GIVE RISE 'J'O STRICT LIABILITY 
There are very good reasons to interpret the Medical Emergency statute as a 
coverage statute and not one creating a strict liability cause of action. Currently, strict 
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liability applies to products liability and inherently dangerous activities. As the two cases 
cited below illustrate, there is no good reason to extend strict liability to motor vehicle 
accidents. The two cases that have addressed the issue of strict liability in the context of 
the Sudden Incapacity defense involve circumstances where a driver loses control of his 
vehicle due to an unforeseen loss of consciousness. Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 
3d 528 (2nd App. Dist. Div. 1, 1971) and Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N .E.2d 422 
(Ohio 2003). Neither of these cases involved any statutes, but only address the 
application of strict liability for a driver's unforeseen loss of consciousness, resulting in 
injury, and in that context have declined to apply strict liability. They conclude this by 
distinguishing the application of strict liability under product liability law versus its 
application to automobile accidents. 
In Hammontree, the defendant, an epileptic under a doctor's care, had been given 
a driver's license on the condition that he follow his prescribed treatment. He followed 
the prescribed treatment. Nonetheless, he blacked out and drove into the plaintiffs 
bicycle shop. The owner of the bicycle shop filed suit, and the court applied negligence 
principles, refusing to support plaintiffs claim that defendant should be responsible for 
the injuries caused by his "black out" or "defective condition". The court did not refer to 
strict liability, but instead held the defendant to principles of negligence, finding that the 
condition was neither abnormally dangerous nor defective, even though the risk of 
seizure could be controlled but not eliminated with medical treatment. Plaintiff was 
unable to prove that the defendant acted unreasonably in light of his condition, and 
recovered nothing. In that case, the California Appellate Court rejected the contention 
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<;,, 
that a driver who loses consciousness (because of a health issue) and his ability to safely 
operate and control the vehicle should be held strictly liable under products liability law. 
The doctrine of product liability law states that: "[a] manufacturer [ or retailer] is 
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, lmowing that it is to be used 
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human 
beings." Id. 532. Appellants claimed that this principle should apply to motor vehicle 
accidents, arguing that: "only the driver affected by a physical condition which could 
suddenly render him unconscious and who is aware of that condition can anticipate the 
(;) hazards and foresee the dangers involved in his operation of a motor vehicle, and that the 
liability of those who by reason of seizure or heart failure or some other physical 
condition lose the ability to safely operate and control a motor vehicle resulting in injury 
to an innocent person should be predicated on strict liability". Id. 532. 
The court, however, refused to apply strict liability to automobile drivers who, by 
virtue of being rendered unconscious, injure innocent victims. In noting this, the court 
declined to "superimpose the absolute liability of products liability cases upon drivers 
[involved in a sudden emergency], stating that: 
The theory on which those cases are predicated is that manufacturers, 
retailers and distributors of products are engaged in the business of 
distributing goods to the public and are an integral part of the over-all 
producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries 
from defective products ... This policy hardly applies here and it is not 
enough to simply say, as do appellants, that the insurance carriers should be 
the ones to bear the cost of injuries to innocent victims on a strict liability 
basis." 
Id. 532. 
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More specifically, the California Appellate Court adopted the reasoning of the 
California Supreme Court in Maloney v. Rath, 445 P .2d 513 (CA 1968), wherein it stated: 
To invoke a rule of strict liability on users of the streets and highways, 
however, without also establishing in substantial detail how the new rule 
should operate would only contribute confusion. to the automobile accident 
problem. Settlement and claims adjustment procedures would become 
chaotic until the new rules were worked out on a case-by-case basis, and 
the hardships of delayed compensation would be seriously intensified. Only 
the Legislature, if it deems it wise to do so, can avoid such difficulties by 
enacting a comprehensive plan for the compensation of automobile accident 
victims in place of or in addition to the law of negligence. 
Id. 532-533. 
The Ohio Supreme Court, in Roman, also addressed strict liability in the context of ~ 
an automobile accident resulting from an unforeseen sudden medical emergency, finding 
that: "strict liability, is principally limited to cases involving products liability and 
"abnormally dangerous activity" and that the concept of liability without fault has no 
place in the circumstances [ where a driver who is suddenly and unforeseeably rendered 
incapacitated causes injury to another party]." Id. ,I 27. 
In discussing negligence and strict liability in the context of an unforeseeable and 
unanticipated loss of consciousness, resulting in injury, the Ohio Supreme Court 
concluded that: 
A central feature of negligence law is that to be found negligent, a 
defendant must have acted unreasonably. Where there is no unreasonable 
conduct, there is no fault. To find a defendant liable for the effects of an 
unforeseen medical emergency that causes sudden unconsciousness would 
be to impose strict liability, which is inappropriate for this situation. 
Id. ,I54. 
The Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the appropriate law to apply: 
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Where the driver of an automobile is suddenly stricken by a period of 
unconsciousness which he has no reason to anticipate and which renders it 
impossible for him to control the car he is driving, he is not chargeable with 
negligence as to such lack of control. 
Id. 156. 
The Injured Parties maintain that the Medical Emergency statute establishes 
strict liability, using legislative intent to support this position. Specifically, they 
rely on the floor debates. However, the sections that the Injured Parties rely on do 
not support their position. For example, they cite to Senator Jones' statement9 
~ regarding the Medical Emergency statute, wherein he states that: 
Right now, the law indicates that the only way you can recover 
damages, either liability or property damage, is to prove that there was 
negligence involved, and in the case of unforeseen medical problems, the 
~ courts have ruled that that is not negligence. It is unforeseen, unpredictable 
and in some cases unavoidable. 
HTTP:l/utahlegislature.granicus.com/mediaplayer.php?clip_id=8198&met 
a_id=400552, time stamped at 45:38. 
From this the Injured Parties conclude that the Medical Emergency statute was 
enacted to require liability carriers to pay bodily injury claims that arise out a sudden, 
unforeseeable medical emergency of an insured driver without having to prove fault. (See 
Senate Floor Debates, Day 23, 1998 General Session, Part I, supra, time stamped 42:02 
and 44: 16.) Senator Jones did not add any language to the statute that states that strict 
liability applies and a showing of fault is not required. 
9 This statement is counsel for the Injured Parties' transcription from listening to the tape 
found in their cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to Lancer's motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 103) 
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To lend further support for their position, the Injured Parties also point to 
subsection (B) of the Medical Emergency statute, which provides that: "The driver's 
liability under subsection (I)(a)(v) is limited to the insurance coverage." This, like the 
statute itself, does not support the Injured Parties' position that the statute creates strict 
liability, meaning that there need not be a finding of fault in order to pay damages up to 
the policy limits. 
More specifically, assuming the statute is ambiguous and it was necessary to resort 
to legislative history, it would not be proper to use floor debates to show legislative 
intent. In this case, the Injured Parties selected specific excerpts from the floor debates to 
support their position. In commenting on the use of legislative history, the Utah Supreme 
Court in Grays v. Northeastern Services, Inc., 345 P.3d 619, if75 (Utah 2015) expressed 
concerns over the use of legislative history, noting that the search for legislative intent is 
perilous for the following reasons: 
[I]n many cases, it is difficult to discover the motives which may 
have prompted those who drew up the text; but it is also dangerous to 
construe upon supposed motives if they are not plainly expressed. 
Everyone is apt to substitute what his ll_lotives would be, or perhaps 
unconsciously to fashion the supposed motives according to his own 
interests and views of the case; and nothing is more ready means to bend 
laws, charters, wills, treaties, etc., according to the preconceived purposes 
then by their construction upon supposed motives. To be brief, unless 
motives are expressed, it is exceedingly difficult to find them out except by 
the text itself; they must form, therefore, in most cases, a subject to be 
found out by the text, not ground on which we construe it. 
In Judge Johnson's June 6, 2014 ruling on the Injured Parties' Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the underlying cases, she addressed the Injured Parties' use of 
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floor debates to support their argument that the intent of the statute at issue is to "abolish 
the sudden medical emergency defense", noting that: 
[ t ]he use of isolated quotes from floor debates to divine the intent of 
the legislature as a whole is problematic, at best. Specifically, all testimony 
of witnesses and individual congressmen, unless very precisely directed to 
the intended meaning of the particular words in a statute, can seldom be 
expected to be as precise as the enacted language itself. To permit what we 
regard as clear statutory language to be materially altered by such 
colloquies, which often take place before the bill has achieved its final 
form, would open the door to the inadvertent or perhaps even planned 
undermining of the language actually voted on by congress and signed into 
law[.] 
In support of the above, Judge Johnson relied on Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 
237 (1984) for the proposition that: "[s]tatutes are the law, not evidence of law". It is for 
this reason that the use of floor debates and similar sources of legislative history are not 
relied upon when the language of the statute itself is clear. In discussing this statute at 
issue, Judge Johnson determined that the plain language of the Medical Emergency 
statute: "is not ambiguous". 
This provision simply directs that insurance policies for motor vehicles . 
must include coverage for damages resulting from drivers who suffer from 
an unforeseeable unconscious condition. Nowhere does it state that a new 
form of strict liability has been created. Now here does it state that any 
principles of tort law have been abrogated or supplanted. To adopt [ the 
Injured Parties'] position is to impose a marked change in tort law absent 
any legislative direction. This the Court is unwilling to do. 
(R. 71, pg. 7). 
The court also noted that if it were to consider legislative history presented by [ the 
Injured Parties], the citations offered are subject to at least two interpretations: 
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The first interpretation is the one advocated by [the Injured Parties], that the 
legislature intended to alter the landscape of tort law and abrogate the 
"sudden medical emergency" defense. The second is that the legislature 
intended to provide a new remedy for victims injured in accidents caused 
by incapacitated drivers-a remedy separate and apart from a cause of 
action for negligence. The remedy is arguably one which arises from a 
contract between drivers and their motor vehicle insurance providers. 
Because subsection ( v) is located in the insurance code, together with the 
other motor vehicle insurance policy coverage requirements, it is more 
reasonable to interpret the legislative intent as the latter. 
(R. 71, pages 7-8) 
Public policy dictates that strict liability should not apply to motor vehicle 
accidents. Rather, the court should adhere to negligence principles as it did in 
Hammontree, i.e. that there must be a finding of fault. "This ... is necessary to preserve 
the autonomy and free movement of the disabled and to avoid imposing extra costs on a 
disabled person who has exercised all reasonable control over the disability. Until we can 
determine that the driver failed to exercise reasonable care over his disability or that the 
risk of getting in the car was excessive in comparison to the importance of the freedom to 
drive, the activity-based decision of the defendant [is] not the source oflegal liability". 
"The Death of Strict Liability," 56 Buffalo L. Rev. 245, 259-260 (April 2008). 
The "tradeoff between the victim's harm and the defendant's freedom of 
movement is a difficult one, but the social value the court endorsed by choosing the 
negligence rule-to preserve the defendant's freedom of movement unless the plaintiff 
can show negligence-is the justifiable one." "The Death of Strict Liability"ld. 260. It 
would be inappropriate to punish and individual with a disability by assessing strict 
liability. Instead the focus on an individual who encounters a sudden medical emergency, 
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such as the individual in Hammontree, should still be the reasonablenes~ of the care he 
took, for example, did he take the medications that day as prescribed. 
In sum, it wouldn't be appropriate to apply strict liability, or liability without 
fault, to motor vehicle accidents where the driver is confronted with a "medical 
emergency". Nor does the statute at issue create a strict liability cause of action. Rather, 
this statute only addresses the types of coverages that must be included in an insurance 
policy. 
·POINT IV 
THE INJURED PARTIES ARE ONLY ENTITLED TO THE STATUTORY 
MINIMUMS IF ANYTHING 
U.C.A. §3 lA-22-303(1 )(a)(v) did not create a cause of action for strict liability nor 
did it alter tort law, negligent principles still apply. The language in this statute simply 
specifies what coverage a motor vehicle insurance policy must include to meet the Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Code Requirements. In the case of a medical emergency under the 
statute, the Injured Parties are not without a remedy. Under U.C.A. §3 lA-22-304, they 
may be entitled to the statutory minimum of $25,000. This issue was addressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Speros v. Fricke, 98 P .3d 28 (Utah 2004). In Fricke the court 
addressed whether the Intentional Act Exclusion is a complete bar to coverage. In 
addressing this issue the court stated that: 
The Utah legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme 
mandating minimum liability coverage for motor vehicles .... This 
legislative enactment reflects public policy requiring vehicle owners to 
carry a minimum level of liability coverage to protect innocent victims of 
automobile accidents. In the case of an owner's liability policy, the statute 
requires that the policy insure the person named in the policy and any 
permissive users "against loss from the liability imposed by law for 
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damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor 
vehicles within the Unites States and Canada ... in the [dollar] amounts not 
less than the minimum limits specified." Id §31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii) 
(Emphasis added). Id. ,r42. (See also §3 lA-22-304, which specifies the minimum 
limits). 
From the above, the court determined that there is no distinction between liability 
arising out of negligent versus intentional acts. The statutory scheme "simply requires 
coverage for all liabilities imposed by law. Because the law imposes liability for damages 
caused negligently and intentionally, we conclude that the statute requires coverage of 
liability ... arising out of intentional, as well as negligent acts ... " Id. ,r43. As such, the 
court held that the "intentional acts exclusion is unenforceable against accident victims 
up to the minimum liability limits prescribed by the statute". Id. ,r44. (See also Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980)", finding 
the n~ed driver exclusion was void up to the mandated statutory minimums, and 
Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 P .2d 231 (Utah 1985), "Household Exclusion void up (&;.) 
to the mandated statutory minimums"). 
By definition, under the facts of this case, there is no fault, and therefore the 
Injured Parties are not entitled to damages. Drawing an analogy, however, from the 
above cited case law would suggest that under Utah law the Injured Parties may be 
entitled to the statutory mioim1rms, if anything. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Lancer requests this Court find that: ( 1) the Sudden Incapacity defense, that tort 
law does not impose liability absent fault, is still good law; (2) the Medical Emergency 
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• 
statute is not ambiguous and is only a coverage statute, which describes the type of 
coverages a motor vehicle liability policy must contain; (3) the statute at issue did not 
create a cause of action for strict liability, but there must be a finding of fault; and ( 4) if 
the Injured Parties are entitled to any recovery, it is limited to the statutory minimums . 
DATED this -1 / 1 ay of June, 2016. 
I V I 
Barbara L. Maw 
Attorney for Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
I. Solorio v. United States of America, reply memo supporting defendant's motion 
for summary judgment at 8, ECF No. 37). 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UT AH, CENTRAL DMSION 
IGNACIO SOLORIO as personal ) 
representative of the estate of ) 
MIGUEL ORNELAS SOLORIO; ) 
FILIBERTO JIMENEZ and ADELEDA ) 
ORELAS SOLORIO as heirs of ) 
decedent MIGUEL ORNELAS ) 
SOLORIO, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v. ) 
) 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
SUPPORTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 2:0lCV 00025 DAK. 
Judge Dale A. Kimball 
Defendant United States of America submits this reply memorandum in response to Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pis.' Opp."). 
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs cannot establish that Defendant 
was negligent in the motor vehicle accident at issue. In response to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Defendant's uMotion"), they have brought fotward no new evidence to cowiter expert 
opinion testimony from Defendant's neurologist that the accident was most likely caused by th 
driver's losing control of the vehicle because she suffered a seizure-like event that was not reaso 
Case 2:01-cv-00025-DAK Document 37 · Filed 09/12702 Page·2 of 13 
foreseeable. Rather, they simply offer their neurologist's certainty ofhis own contrary opinion, which 
he admits he cannot justify based on authoritative literature or his own clinical experience. Because 
a private party would not be found liable in these circwnstances under Utah law, the United States 
cannot be found liable wider the Federal Tort Claims Act, and Defendant is entitled to summazy 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs' expert neurologist Dr. Savia, a graduate of medical school in Grenada, West Indies, 
stated that "I can't say'' whether the driver's seizure began before or after the accident. (Savia 
Depa. at Exhibit 3 (curriculum vitae, copy attached), 41 :2-4 (copy attached).) He elaborated 
on his uncertainty: "There's no real way of telling .... You have to make some assumptions 
.... So without having any other documentation of anything else happening beforehand, I 
can't tell that a seizure occurred before the accident." (Id. at41 :2-24.) Nevertheless, Dr. Savia 
decided to assume, with "probably ... 99.99 percent" certainty, that the seizure began after 
the accident. (Id. at 25 :2-9.) 
2. Having made this assumption with "no real way of telling," Dr. Savia then assumed that the 
accident caused the seizure. (Id. at 7:22-8:4 "[Ms .. Michel] had a seizure shortly after some 
type ofhead trauma, so we have to assume that the head trauma [of the accident] caused the 
seizure.'') 
3. Although Dr. Savia stated that "I'll bet I could probably dig something up" in medical or 
scientific literature to support his conclusion that a blow to the head from an airbag could 
cause a seizure (id. at 14:4-7), he has offered no such evidence to support his opinion, even 
in response to Defendant's motion. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant's position is 
insufficient to create a dispute of fact that is 'genuine'; an issue of material fact is genuine only if the 
nonmovant presents facts such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmovant." Planned 
ParenthoodofRockyMountainsServices, Corp. v. Owens,287F.3d910,916(10th Cir.2002)(citation 
and quotation omitted). Once the movant shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the 
nonmovant cannot rest upon his or her pleadings, ''but must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial." Cudjoe v. Independent School Dist. No. 12, 297 F.3d 1058, 1062 (10th 
Cir. 2002). Thus, to defeat Defendant's Motion, Plaintiffs have the burden of showing specific facts 
~ that could persuade a reasonable fact-finder to rule in their favor. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs have not specifically controverted Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts as required by applicable rules of this Court, and so they are deemed admitted pursuant to 
·nucivR 56-1 ( c ). · Moreover, Dr. Savia's testimony that he is "probably ... 99.99 percent" certain Ms. 
Michel did not have a seizure before the accident, without any support in medicine, science or logic, 
cannot create a "genuine" factual issue to defeat Defendant's Motion. Defendant is entitled to 
summary judgment because Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of showing specific facts sufficient 
~ to support a finding of negligence. 
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I. DR. SA VIA'S TESTIMONY DOES NOT DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
According to applicable Utah law, Plaintiffs have the burden of proving each element of their 
claim of negligence under a "more likely than not" standard. See Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 
568,574 (Utah 1996) (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts§ 41, 
at 265 (5 th ed. 1984); citation omitted). In opposing Defendant's Motion, Plaintiffs apparently argue 
that Dr. Savia's testimony, no matter how ill-founded, will carry their burden. They are mistaken as 
a matter of law. Dr. Savia's opinion is so unreliable that it is inadmissible as expert testimony 
pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702. Moreover, even ifit were admissible, it is so speculative that it could 
not create a "genuine" factual issue to defeat summary judgment. 
A. Dr. Savia's "opinion" is not admissible as expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
Plaintiffs, as proponents of Dr. Savia's evidence, have the burden of demonstrating 
admissibility of his "opinion" under Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). See Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,592 n. 10 (1993). The Supreme Court has clearly charged the 
trial judge with "ensur[ing] that ·any and all scientific· testimony or evidence admitted is not only 
relevant, but reliable." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-93. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
137, J 51 (1999) (objective of Daubert's gatekeeping requirement "is to ensure the reliability and 
relevancyofexperttestimony");Hollanderv. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp.,289F.3d 1193, 1203-04 
(10th Cir. 2002) (applying Daubert analysis to affinn district court's decision to exclude evidence 
from medical experts as not sufficiently reliable to be admissible); Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Co., 21SF.3d1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2000) ( district court must perform its gatekeeper 
function (relying on Kumho Tire, Scalia, J., concurring)). The Daubert standard excludes evidence 
that is no more than "subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. In 
4 
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particular, "nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to 
admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert." Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U:S. 136, 146 (1997). 
The Tenth Circuit has held that "an expert, no matter how good his credentials, is not permitted 
to speculate." Goebel, 215 F .3d at 1088 ( citation omitted). Moreover, ''merely possessing a medical 
degree is not sufficient to permit a physician to testify concerning any medical-related issue." Ralston 
v. Smith & Nephew•Richards, Inc., 275 F .3d 965," 970 (10th Cir. 2001) ( citation omitted). In Ralston, 
the district court's decision to exclude medical testimony was affirmed. where an orthopedic surgeon 
admitted that she was not an expert regarding the particular surgical technique at issue and had never 
researched the medical device at issue. Id. at 969-970. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a 
district court's decision to exclude testimony from a doctor who admitted that ''her view was merely 
a 'curbside' observation based solely on a temporal relationship [between taking ibuprofen and 
suffering renal failure]," and from another doctor who acknowledged that no scientific studies or data 
supported his opinions. Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 611-614 (7th Cir. 1993) (evidence 
was properly excluded "because it was not well-grounded in the scientific method''). 
Dr. Savia's evidence should also be excluded as not well-grounded in the scientific method. 
He has admitted he is not an expert on epilepsy (Facts ,r 11) and that his "opinion" that a seizure did 
not cause the accident is based upon two assumptions: (1) that Ms. ·Michel's seizure began after the 
accident, and (2) that it was caused by her head striking the airbag. (Statement of Additional 
Undisputed Facts ("Addnl. Facts") 111-2.) He has further admitted that he has no basis for these 
~ assumptions. (J_d. 1,r 1, 3.) Apparently trying to bolster his speculative testimony, Dr. Savia asserts 
that he is ''probably ... 99.99 percenr certain of his otherwise unsupported opinion. (Id. 'if 1.) 
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Dr. Savia has admitted that he knows of no support in medical or scientific literature for his 
opinion that Ms. Michel suffered a seizure because her head struck the airbag, and that he has not 
faced a similar situation in his years of clinical practice. (Facts ,r 8 ("I don't have anything offhand 
showing that, but I'll bet I could probably dig something up on that.").) Even in response to Dr. 
Matsuo' s report and deposition testimony, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dr. Savia 
has failed to "dig up" any scientific or medical literature to support his opinion. 
Dr. Savia's "opinion" is based on admittedly unfounded assumptions and is unsupported by 
either scholarly literature or clinical experience. It is precisely the sort of"curbside obseivation," or 
unreliable "subjective belief or unsupported speculation" that the Court is charged with excluding 
from evidence. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; Porter, 9 F.3d at 611,614.1 
B. Even if admissible. Dr. Savia's testimony is too speculative to defeat summary judgment. 
Even if the Court admitted Dr. Savia's ''opinion" as expert testimony, Plaintiffs' case would 
fail as a matter of logic and common sense. Plaintiffs and Dr. Savia would have the factfinder-the 
Court, in this case-believe the following, unlikely series of events: Ms. Michel was fully conscious 
. and pressing on the gas pedal as she veered off State Street at full speed and hit a dirt pile, a cement 
barrier and then Mr. Solorio, and that she continued pressing her foot on the gas pedal all the while. 
Although Dr. Savia has never seen anything similar in his studies or his clinical practice, he would 
have the Court believe that the driver had a grand mal seizure from hitting her head on the airbag, and 
that she kept pressing the gas pedal until Mr. Fobert dislodged her foot with great difficulty. 
1 
_Plaintiffs urge the Court to find that Dr. Matsuo's and Dr. Caravati's opinions are "also 
clearly speculative, and thus inadmissible." (Pls.' Opp. at 12-13.) However, Plaintiffs provide no 
facts or legal authority to support their conclusory argwnent. 
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Plaintiffs apparently argue that the Court could find that the accident "more likely than not" 
occurred in the improbable manner just described, even though common sense alone suggests that a 
fully conscious driver would not continue to press on the gas pedal through these events. However, 
_ the Court need not rely on common sense alone, because Dr. Matsuo's studied, reasoned analysis, 
backed by clinical experience and scholarly literature, provides reliable evidence that Ms. Michel was 
not fully conscious, but rather suffered an unforeseeable seizure-like event that caused the accident. 
Moreover, Dr. Savia has admitted that he is not an expert on seizures and that Dr. Matsuo is. (Facts 
,r 11.) Dr. Savia' s unfounded opinion is no more than the classic "scintilla of evidence" that does not 
create a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. See 
Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountains v. Owens, 287 F.3d at 916 (10th Cir. 2002). 
II. PLAINTIFFS HA VE NOT CARRIED THEIR BURDEN OF SHOWING SPECIFIC 
FACTS TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE .. 
A. Utah has rejected a strict liability or "negligence per se" standard. 
Plaintiffs seem to argue that the Court could find negligence here simply because the 
government van left the roadway while Ms. Michel drove. (Pls.' Opp. at 4-6.) However, the Utah 
Supreme Court has soundly rejected a strict liability or "negligence per se" standard, which would find 
a party who had violated a safety statute negligent regardless of fault. See Klafta v. Smith, 404 P .2d 
659, 661 (Utah 1965). Calling such a standard "completely discordantto reason and justice," the court 
instead held to "one of the oldest and most basic precepts of tort law: that generally liability is based 
upon fault.'' Id. Simply put, violation of a statutory safety standard may be evidence of negligence, 
but it does not establish negligence. Thus, Plaintiffs' recitation of various statutes Ms. Michel may 
have violated does not establish negligence. 
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B. Plaintiffs' arguments about the legal standard for negligence in Utah are simply wrong. 
Plaintiffs argue that a private party in Utah would be liable in these circumstances (Pis.' Opp. 
at 1-2 and n. 1 ), that the case cannot be decided on summary judgment (id. at 8-9), and that Defendant 
has the burden of proving that this accident occurred without negligence. All of these arguments fail. 
Plaintiffs' statement at note 1 of their memorandum, that "[i]n Utah, a driver is liable to an 
injured party even where that injury is caused by some sudden incapacitating event such as a heart 
attack, seizure, etc.," is both wrong and misleading. The statute that Plaintiffs cite for this proposition, 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-303(1)(a)(iv), says nothing of the sort. Rather, this section of Utah's insurance 
code addresses insurance policy coverage limits and does not apply to this case.2 
Plaintiffs are also wrong in suggesting, based on Utah case law, that this case cannot be 
decided on summary judgment. The cases that they cite, Porter v. Price, 355 P.2d 66 (Utah 1960), 
and Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993), do not support Plaintiffs' argument. In Randle, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that an ''unavoidable accident" jury instruction was not necessary, and that 
"the same result may be reached by a proper application of the elements of a cause of action for 
negligence." 862 P.2d at 1335. The court specifically noted that "[e]xcept for intentional torts and 
strict products liability, modem tort law does not generally impose liability for personal injury absent 
fault or negligence on the part of the defendant." Id. Far from requiring that all cases be sent to juries, 
2 The statute states, in relevant-part: 
(l){a) .... a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under 
Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a) shall: .... 
(iv) cover damages or injury resulting from a covered driver of a 
motor vehicle who is stricken by an unforeseeable paralysis, seizure, 
or other unconscious condition .... 
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the court stated: 
Accidents do occur which might be unavoidable or for which the defendant or 
defendants are not negligent. In such cases, if the state of the evidence 
warrants it, the trial judge should direct a verdict, or the jury, applying proper 
instructions on the elements of negligence and burden ofprooft should findru2 
liability. 
Id. at 1336 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court recently quoted precisely this passage from 
Randle as the legal standard in an auto collision case. See Green v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638,644 (2001). 
The Green and Randle decisions make clear that in Utah, the theory that an accident occurred 
without negligence is presented through ''the elements of negligence and burden of proof," rather than 
through an affirmative defense. See also Martinez v. Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 961-62 (Wyo. 1990) 
("act of God" theory "is not an affirmative defense but, simply, addresses the essential elements of 
the cause of action in tort"); Cox v. Vernieuw, 604 P.2d 1353, 1357-59 (Wyo. 1980) ("an Act of God 
is no more than another way of saying that the defendants were not negligent .... [T]he case really 
ends with the finding of no negligence ... :') (cited in Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d at 1336). Thus, 
Plaintiffs' assertions about the claimed burden of Defendant to prove what Plaintiffs characterize as 
the "affirmative defense" of sudden loss of consciousness (Pls.' Opp. at 6-10) mis-state Utah law. 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P .2d 293 (Utah 1982) ( cited in Pis.' Opp. at 6), discusses 
burdens of proof in cases of intentional torts, not negligence. Seale v. Gowans, 923 P .2d 1361 (Utah 
1996) ( cited in Pls.' Opp. at 6-7), refers to the affirmative defense of asserting a statute oflimitations. 
Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., which has an extensive list of affirmative defenses, does not refer to 
"sudden loss of consciousness" or anything equivalent. Research by counsel for Defendant has 
revealed no applicable authority for Plaintiffs' proposition that Defendant has any heightened burden 
either to plead or to prove sudden loss of consciousness in a negligence case. 
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As stated above, Plaintiffs have the burden of proving each element of their negligence claim 
under a "more likely than not" standard. See Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, S74 (Utah 1996). 
Because their evidence cannot establish that Ms. Michel was more likely negligent than not, 
:pefendant is entitled to summary judgment. 
C. The Court should not find negligence here as a matter of both law and policy. 
To the extent that tort law serves to deter negligence and encourage reasonable prudence, such 
goals would not be served by finding negligence in these circumstances. An event like the 
unforeseeable seizure-like event Ms. Michel suffered cannot be anticipated, avoided, or prevented. 
Thus, a finding of liability here could not have any conceivable effect to deter another, similarly 
unforeseeable and tragic event. Rather, it would simply punish Defendant and, indirectly, the driver, 
for not foreseeing the wiforeseeab le. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no question that this is a tragic case. However, as set forth above and in Defendant's 
earlier memorandum, the Court can and should find that Plaintiffs cannot carry their burden of 
establishing that Defendant was negligent. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully requests the Court 
to enter summary judgment in its favor and dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice. 
DATED this@ day of September, 2002. 
PAULM. WARNER 
United States Attorney 
m£A-wv ANNETTE F. SWENT 
J HN K. MANGUM 
Assistant United States Attorneys 
Attorneys for United States of America 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84138 
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